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ABSTRACT
We compare the more common physician compensation method of fee-for-service to the less
common payment-for-outcomes method. This paper combines an investigation of the theoretical
properties of both of these payment regimes with a unique data set from rural Cameroon in which
patients can choose between outcome and service based payments. We show that consideration of
the role of patient effort in the production of health leads to important differences in the performance
of these contracts. Theory and empirical evidence show that when illnesses require (or are
responsive to) large amounts of both patient and practitioner effort, outcome based payment schemes
are superior to effort based schemes. The traditional healer  n a practitioner who offers health
services on an outcome-contingent basis  n is advanced as an important example of how patient
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jz126@columbia.eduIn the vast majority of health care delivery systems around the globe, physician compen-
sation is input based—physicians are compensated based on the eﬀort or services that they
provide to patients. Intuition, however, suggests that outcome based compensation should
be preferred. Paying directly for the item of value (outcomes) makes more sense than paying
for inputs which have no direct value, and when physician behavior is diﬃcult to properly
monitor or evaluate, it should be easier to align incentives with outcome based payments.
The absence of such compensation schemes is generally based on practical concerns about
the veriﬁability of outcomes or the potential manipulation of such a system by physicians
to the disadvantage of patients (refusing diﬃcult patients for example.) Even in situations
where these concerns can be overcome, such as the African setting that forms the basis of our
empirical analysis, another more fundamental concern about the nature of health production
poses challenges to the presumed supremacy of outcome-contingent compensation schemes.
Physician eﬀort is not the only determinant of health outcomes; patient eﬀort also matters.
Healthiness is generally created by the joint eﬀort of both patients and physicians and this
has important implications for the implementation and eﬀectiveness of both outcome and
eﬀort based compensation.
In this paper, we introduce a basic model of joint production of health where both pa-
tients and physicians provide unobservable eﬀort that aﬀects outcomes following H¨ olmstrom
(1982).1 We model two types of payment schemes: outcome-contingent and eﬀort-contingent.
For both forms of contracts there exists a third party who can implement contracts and will
seek to maximize social welfare (the joint utility of patient and practitioner). This third
party can be thought of as the employer or regulator of the practitioner. In the outcome-
contingent scheme, physician and patient each earn utility from the outcome of treatment.
In the eﬀort-contingent contract the patient earns utility from outcomes and pays for ser-
1Unobservable eﬀort in physician behavior is referred to as imperfect agency in the health economics
literature and moral hazard in the general economics literature. For background on views of imperfect
agency in health care see Gaynor (1994, p. 222) and McGuire (2000, p. 499). In the model used in this
paper, we intend imperfect agency to cover unobservable diagnostic quality or eﬀort. Thus the term hidden
eﬀort is a more precise term and terms such as quality, shirking, or slacking–oﬀ mirror the concerns of this
paper.
2vices delivered. The third party, who can observe physician eﬀort, forces the physician to
provide a particular level of eﬀort. The structure of information plays an important role in
this model, as in all models of asymmetric information. We assume the following:
• Both physicians and patients can observe outcomes but patients cannot evaluate med-
ical eﬀort and physicians cannot observe patient eﬀort.
• The third party (regulator) can observe outcomes and medical eﬀort but cannot observe
or infer patient eﬀort.
Under these assumptions, we show that both contracts achieve the full information
result—the result that would be obtained if every action were observable—and are there-
fore interchangeable. Administrative simplicity or any other factor can determine choice of
contract form. However, we assume that in the real world there are at least two additional in-
formational restrictions: First, that the regulator cannot use payments that transfer the full
beneﬁts or costs of health outcomes to physicians (no scheme can make a practitioner care as
much about outcomes as the patient). Second, that the regulator cannot adequately model
the behavioral response of patients as a function of physician behavior, and therefore sets
medical eﬀort assuming patient eﬀort is either unimportant on the margin or unresponsive
to medical eﬀort.
Under these conditions, the best way to compensate physicians depends on the charac-
teristics of the illness being treated. Speciﬁcally, when there are large degrees of complemen-
tarity between patient and physician eﬀort, compensation should be based on outcomes (if
the outcome is veriﬁable.) When the degree of complementarity is low, compensation should
be based on physician eﬀort. In other words, surgery, where short-term success has little to
do with patient eﬀort, should be compensated based on physician eﬀort, and back pain that
relies heavily on the eﬀort of both participants should be based on outcomes. The choice of
eﬀort- or outcome-contingent contracts does not hinge on the importance of unobservable
medical eﬀort, but rather on the joint importance of medical and patient eﬀort.
3There is, to the best of our knowledge, only one health delivery institution that delivers
a wide spectrum of health care services and is paid on the basis of outcomes: the African
traditional healer. The reason traditional healers are able to use this contract is that the
institution of traditional medicine allows for veriﬁable outcomes for all illnesses; patients
believe that traditional healers are the agents of higher powers and that these higher powers
can verify all outcomes (Leonard, 2003). This allows us to test our ﬁndings on a data set from
rural Cameroon in which patients choose between diﬀerent types of health care providers; one
compensated through eﬀort–contingent contracts and the other through outcome–contingent
ones. We show that patients choose practitioners according to exactly the criterion outlined
in the theory section; they prefer traditional healers for illness conditions where the elas-
ticities of outcomes with respect to both medical and patient eﬀort are high. These basic
patterns are consistent with those found in other African settings (Mwabu, 1986).
In examining the practices of traditional healers, one of the features most salient to this
paper is the focus they place on the eﬀort of patients. Healers spend almost as much eﬀort
molding patient activities as diagnosing and curing patients. We suggest this is not a coin-
cidence, but rather a feature of the contracts they oﬀer. We do not suggest that traditional
healers can or should be emulated, but rather that if outcome-contingent contracts (of any
form) are to be used, they should be used primarily where both patients and practitioners
provide cooperative eﬀort towards a cure.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces a basic theoretical model
of the joint production of health with two-sided moral hazard. The full derivation of the
model is presented in Appendix A. Equilibrium eﬀort levels, utility, and social welfare when
payment is eﬀort contingent and when payment is outcome contingent are analyzed. Section
two tests our theoretical results using a unique data set from Africa. The third section dis-
cusses alternative methods of modeling patient–practitioner interaction and the ﬁnal section
concludes.
41 A Model of Health Care
We model the net expected value from seeking health care as a function of the opportunity
cost of healthy time (ω) and the expected increase in health (h), net the cash costs of seeking
care (C) and the disutility of the patient’s own eﬀort in producing her own health (p).
∆EU = ωh − C − c(p) (1)
h is the expected value of H.2 One obvious way to motivate this simple speciﬁcation is by
a health capital model where investments in health increase the amount of time available to
patients for work and leisure (Grossman, 1975). In this view ω is the value of an additional
hour created, i.e. the wage or the opportunity cost of leisure. All subsequent analysis deﬁnes
patient and social welfare in terms of the net utility of expected health outcomes, and for
simplicity we will refer to ∆EU as U.
The expected value of increased health, h, is a function of a number of diﬀerent inputs;
a production function of health. We assume the following factors are important in the
production of health: medical eﬀort, patient eﬀort, medical skill and patient eﬃciency at
transforming health inputs into health. An increase in any of these factors, ceteris paribus
increases the probability of the patient being cured. The role of each of these factors will
vary according to the illness condition.
We hypothesize that for an illness and treatment regime medical and patient eﬀort are
complements. When more of either eﬀort is provided the marginal impact of the other will
increase. It is also equivalent to state that when more of one eﬀort is provided the cost of the
other eﬀort decreases. Either patient eﬀort makes medical eﬀort more eﬀective or it makes
it less diﬃcult for the practitioner to provide.
We do not suggest that medical and patient eﬀort are global complements. It is important
2The astute reader will note that this could contain some undesirable assumptions about the nature of risk
aversion. Appendix A.1 demonstrates that the model employed here can, with some basic assumptions about
the distribution of health outcomes, be derived from a model that is consistent with risk averse patients.
5to recognize the diﬀerence between ex ante and ex post substitutability. An illness may be
treatable by two diﬀerent technologies (an injury may be treated by surgery or physical
therapy) and each technology uses very diﬀerent levels of medical and patient eﬀort. A
patient eﬀort–intensive technology may substitute for a medical eﬀort–intensive technology,
but this is ex ante substitutability. Once the technology has been chosen, medical and
patient eﬀort are complements: increased medical eﬀort enhances the impact of the patient
eﬀort under physical therapy and increased patient eﬀort increases the impact of medical
eﬀort under surgery. We assume that the ex ante choice of technology depends on factors
outside the concern of this paper (such as relative costs of inputs). In developing countries
(the concern of our empirical section) patient eﬀort–intensive technology prevails.3





where π is the productivity factor, p is the patient eﬀort, α is the elasticity of output
with respect to patient eﬀort, m is medical eﬀort and β is the elasticity of output with
respect to medical eﬀort. The productivity factor is an increasing function of the skill of
the practitioner and the skill of the patient (eﬃciency of the patient in transforming health
inputs into health). We will not specify a functional form for π, but it is increasing in both
medical and patient skill. There are decreasing returns to scale in the production of health
and therefore we assume that 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1 and 0 < α + β < 1. For simplicity of
notation we will refer to the product of productivity (π) and the value of health (ω) as A,
a technology scale. A can be thought of as the value of obtaining health care, a measure
that embodies the beneﬁts (relative to letting the disease run its natural course) from being
3Van der Geest and Sarkodie (1998) provide an eye-opening description of life as a patient in a typical
African hospital, including the extensive reliance on family to provide important nursing functions.
6healthy and the ability of the practitioner to provide that health. Thus utility is,
U = Ap
αm
β − p − C (3)
and practitioner utility is a function of eﬀort (−m) and a transfer T, which may or may
not be equal to the payment of the patient.
Y = T − m (4)
1.1 Production with Full Information
As a basis of comparison for the cases with asymmetric information, we will ﬁrst analyze the
problem for the case with full information. This case corresponds to a world where both the
practitioner and the patient observe the other’s eﬀort and there is no coordination problem.
The full information solution is interesting because it represents the best possible outcome.
Social welfare is the sum of patient utility and practitioner income, which is simply patient
utility from health net of eﬀort costs (all transfers balance out).
W = Ap
αm
β − p − m (5)
Maximizing welfare with respect to p and m we obtain the two ﬁrst order conditions. To-
gether, these ﬁrst order conditions allow us to deﬁne an optimal level of patient and prac-
titioner eﬀort that are a function of the value of health care, the marginal productivities of
eﬀort, and the costs of eﬀort. We represent these optimal levels as p?
FI and m?
FI, where the
subscript FI denotes the full information solution. These expressions for optimal eﬀort levels
can then be employed to determine social welfare (WFI) and practitioner and patient utility
(UFI). Under the assumption that health care is valuable (A is large enough), p?
FI,m?
FI,WFI
and UFI are all increasing in the elasticity of outcomes with respect to medical and patient
eﬀort (α and β) as well as the technology, A (See Appendix A.2.)
71.2 Joint Production with Dual Unobservable Eﬀort
Here patients cannot observe practitioner’s eﬀort and vice versa, i.e. a world with joint
production and double-sided asymmetric information. Under the eﬀort–contingent contract
the third party (employer or regulator) chooses physician eﬀort to maximize social welfare.
The regulator cannot observe patient eﬀort, but he uses some approximation which we
represent as ˜ p, the regulator’s guess of patient eﬀort. Under outcome–contingent contracts
the only parameter of choice is the share of the outcome for the physician (sm) and the
patient (sp). This share could be set by the regulator, by bargaining between physician and
patient or by some other convention. Under both contracts, the full information solution
can be achieved.
Eﬀort–Contingent Contracts The regulator, since he can observe medical eﬀort, can
choose the level of medical eﬀort. However, he cannot observe patient eﬀort and, due to
the stochasticity of health outcomes, he cannot infer it by looking at outcomes. Thus, the




β − ˜ p − m (6)
The regulator chooses medical eﬀort such that the marginal productivity of medical eﬀort,
evaluated at the regulator’s estimate of patient eﬀort, ˜ p, is equal to the marginal cost of
medical eﬀort.
The patient responds to practitioner eﬀort through her choice of eﬀort, choosing her eﬀort
so as to maximize her utility. Using patient and practitioner optimal eﬀort we obtain equi-


























The subscript E denotes the eﬀort–contingent solution. UFI is the full information utility
and p?
FI is the level of patient eﬀort that would have been provided under the full information
solution. When ˜ p = p?
FI the full information solution will obtain. Thus, if the regulator can
model patient behavior accurately he will achieve the full information (optimal) solution.
When ˜ p < p?
FI (the regulator assumes patients do less than the actually do), practitioner
eﬀort decreases at the expense of patient utility. The practitioner is not working hard enough.
When ˜ p > p?
FI (the regulator assumes patients do more than they actually do), practitioner
eﬀort increases to the beneﬁt of patient utility. The practitioner is working too hard. Social
welfare under eﬀort–contingent contracts is equal to full information social welfare when ˜ p =
p?
FI. When ˜ p > p?
FI or when ˜ p < p?
FI welfare under the eﬀort based contracts is strictly less
than welfare under full information. Patient utility, however, can be greater than under full
information because the patient does not have to compensate the practitioner for working
too hard.
Outcome–Contingent Payments In this case, practitioner and patient receive payment
as a function of output. We call the share to the patient sp and the share to the practitioner
sm. Given the shares, we obtain
U = spAp
αm
β − p (8)
Y = smAp
αm
β − m (9)
9We assume a Nash solution and equilibrium is found where each player’s choice of eﬀort is
equal to the other player’s expectation. The regulator plays no role beyond choosing the
shares and implementing the terms of the contract. He does not need to observe m and
cannot observe p. We represent utility and social welfare as functions of full information
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1 when sm and sp are both equal to 1; when each participant receives the full rewards for





1−α−β is less than one. If either the patient or the practitioner (or both) do
not face the full incentives to provide eﬀort they will each under–provide it. In such a case
patient utility and social welfare under outcome–contingent contracts are inferior to patient
utility and social welfare under the full information solution.4
1.3 The Constrained Regulator
If ˜ p = p?
FI and sp = sm = 1 both contracts achieve full information and there is no diﬀerence
between them. In a second-best world where these conditions do not hold, neither payment
scheme is uniformly superior. Welfare is maximized through outcome–contingent contracts
for some illnesses and through eﬀort–contingent contracts for others. To form hypotheses
on the relative advantages of these contracts we develop a more explicit model of these
restrictions.
4This is an extension of the well–established ﬁnding that under dual eﬀort when the budget is balanced,
the full information solution cannot be obtained (H¨ olmstrom, 1982).
10Modeling of Patient Eﬀort We assume that the regulator’s view of patient eﬀort, ˜ p is
invariant with respect to illness conditions. This corresponds immediately to three possible
views on the part of the regulator. First, he may see patient eﬀort as being ﬁxed; patients
provide the same amount of eﬀort for every illness condition. Second he may not recognize the
role of patient eﬀort in health care, maximizing welfare of the form ˆ Amβ−m (with ˆ A = A˜ pα);
the regulator sees the beneﬁt of patient eﬀort as being an illness speciﬁc technology shift,
not the input of a rational participant. Or third, he may believe that patients provide eﬀort,
perhaps even rational amounts of eﬀort, but that the level of patient eﬀort should not change
the level of medical eﬀort provided. The solution to the regulator’s problem is identical for
all three views of patient eﬀort.
This view of regulators matches the empirical setting in which we will test the theory.
Regulators completely ignore the possibility that patient eﬀort is important, and certainly
do not see patient eﬀort as a variable input that they can manipulate to their advantage. In
general, though most health professionals would readily admit that patient eﬀort matters,
little attention is paid to whether or not patient eﬀort should aﬀect the level of medical eﬀort.
Thus, whether or not regulators are de jure constrained in their views of patient eﬀort they
are certainly de facto constrained.
In our model of complementary eﬀorts in team production, patient eﬀort is useful to
the practitioner. It increases the eﬀectiveness of his own eﬀort. This will be particularly
important for illnesses that require extensive joint eﬀort. The regulator must not only
recognize that patient eﬀort increases the probability of a cure, he must also recognize that
patient eﬀort increases the usefulness of medical eﬀort, and that increased medical eﬀort will
induce the patient to do more. There is a virtuous circle that the regulator must recognize
ex ante.
Less-than-complete incentives We model the regulator’s inability to force physicians
and patients to face the full impact of outcomes as a contract in which sp < 1 and/or sm < 1.
11It is diﬃcult to provide the practitioner with the full incentives to exert medical eﬀort since
this would imply that he would experience the same disutility from failed cancer treatment,
for example, as the patient. The patient may also not face the full incentives to exert eﬀort
due to risk sharing arrangements, such as disability, life or health insurance, that try to
reduce the disutility of adverse health outcomes. A special case of reduced incentives is
that where the shares are forced to sum to one sp + sm = 1.5 This will be the case for
the traditional healer, who is our example of an outcome–contingent contract used in the
empirical section.
When the shares are less than one, each participant has a marginally reduced incentive
to provide eﬀort. It does not mean that they provide no eﬀort, but only that they provide
less than the optimal level of eﬀort.
Anticipated impact of these constraints Under these assumptions we can anticipate
that both the outcome– and eﬀort–contingent contract will fall short of the full information
solution. However, they will do so in diﬀerent ways. Speciﬁcally, the outcome–contingent
contract will always be inferior to the full information setting but still contains a reduced
element of the virtuous circle. Even though each party has less incentive to exert eﬀort than
they would if they faced the full share of outcome, they still recognize the beneﬁcial impact
of the other player’s eﬀort. This will not be true with the eﬀort–contingent contract as we
have modeled it. Thus, the outcome–contingent contract is likely to do better for those
illness conditions where joint eﬀort is important in the cure. We formalize this intuition in
the following section.
1.4 Eﬀort– vs. Outcome–Contingent Payments
Outcomes are diﬀerent under these two possible contracts in the second-best6 world. We
examine patient utility and total welfare. The diﬀerence in patient utility across regimes is:
5This is an example of the balanced budget constraint discussed in H¨ olmstrom (1982).
6Second-best, in this and all subsequent references, implies sp < 1 or sm < 1 and ˜ p constant.

















The sign of this expression depends on the value of ˜ p. If ˜ p is very small then utility is greater
under the outcome–contingent contract (UO > UE). On the other hand, if ˜ p is very large
then the opposite is true (UO < UE). We do not know ˜ p a priori, but if ˜ p is ﬁxed, we can
determine the conditions under which UO is most likely to be greater than UE and when UO
is least likely to be greater than UE. Whatever the level of patient eﬀort assumed by the
practitioner, we can determine the conditions under which one contract is most likely to be
superior to the other.
Deﬁne ˆ p as the value of ˜ p such that patient utility is equivalent in both regimes: UO −
UE|(˜ p=ˆ p) = 0. By construction, when ˜ p > ˆ p, Equation 11 is negative and patient utility is
larger when physician compensation is eﬀort–contingent. When ˜ p < ˆ p, the opposite is true.
Although ˆ p varies with α and β, ˜ p is ﬁxed and therefore UO is more likely to be greater
(less) than UE when ˆ p is larger (smaller). The magnitude of ˆ p depends on the nature of the
disease condition, speciﬁcally the elasticity of health production with respect to patient and
practitioner eﬀort. Therefore, regime performance can be characterized through an analysis
of changes in ˆ p with respect to α and β.7






∂α∂β are all positive. These signs of the
ˆ p derivatives imply that utility in the outcome–contingent regime is most likely to exceed
utility in the eﬀort–contingent regime when α and β are both large. In other words, outcome–
contingent payment schemes are best for disease conditions when both physician and patient
eﬀort are productive. The intuition is straightforward. When both productivities are high, a
feedback mechanism is necessary so that one agent’s eﬀort encourages provision by the other.
This feedback is achieved by conditioning payments on outcomes, which are, of course, a
result of joint eﬀort. When physician eﬀort is productive, but patient eﬀort is not, payment
7Note that a given illness condition is deﬁned by α and β and therefore α and β do not change. Changes
in α and β reﬂect comparisons between illness conditions.
13on physician eﬀort is suﬃcient. When patient eﬀort is productive, but physician eﬀort is
not, the compensation scheme of the practitioner is unimportant when patients face the
full incentives, which they do under eﬀort–contingent contracts but do not under outcome–
contingent contracts.8 Thus we have our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 In a second-best world, the physician compensation scheme preferred by pa-
tients depends on the illness condition. Outcome-contingent payments are better than eﬀort–
contingent payments for illnesses where the marginal productivities of both patient and physi-
cian eﬀort are high. Eﬀort-contingent payments are better than outcome–contingent pay-
ments for illnesses where the marginal productivity of medical or patient eﬀort is high, but
not both.
The welfare implications are similar, though not as straight-forward to illuminate. We
can derive the following proposition
Proposition 2 In a second-best world, when outcome–contingent patient utility is greater
than or equal to eﬀort–contingent patient utility, outcome–contingent welfare is always supe-
rior to eﬀort–contingent welfare.
The proof is contained in Appendix 21. Both welfare and patient utility are more likely
to be greater under outcome–contingent contracts when α and β are both high. When
both α and β are high, illness conditions exhibit a high degree of eﬀort complementarity,
where complementarity implies that both eﬀorts are necessary for the treatment of the illness
condition. On the other hand, for illness conditions in which either α or β is large, but not
both, social welfare and patient utility are higher under eﬀort–contingent regimes. Here
eﬀorts do not exhibit high degrees of complementarity. One eﬀort or the other is necessary,
but not high levels of both.
Proposition 2 is important because it suggests that when we observe patient utility greater
under the outcome–contingent contract we can conclude that welfare is also greater under the
8Note that the above holds true when both sp < 1 and sm < 1. If sp = 1 then outcome–contingent
contracts will be superior to eﬀort–contingent ones in this case.
14outcome–contingent contract. In the empirical analysis that follows our analysis is of utility,
not welfare. We choose this focus because our empirical strategy depends on observing
patient choice, which is determined by utility not welfare. However, the implications of the
model (in terms of the potential superiority of outcome–contingent contracts) will hold for
welfare as well.
2 Empirical Evidence
This paper makes strong predictions about factors that impact a patient’s choice of contract
when they suﬀer from illnesses that have observable and veriﬁable outcomes. When prac-
titioners are associated with certain types of contracts these same factors (among others)
should impact a patient’s choice of practitioner. In particular, we expect that the degree of
complementarity of medical and patient eﬀort should be an important determinant of the
choice of practitioner when one practitioner oﬀers only the outcome–contingent contract and
the other oﬀers only the eﬀort–contingent contract.
Patients in rural Africa face precisely this choice of practitioners. Patients can choose
between traditional healers, who oﬀer health care on an outcome–contingent basis, and
modern medicine where health care is delivered in a fee–for–service environment. As these
fee–for–service practitioners are part of organizations that monitor and enforce the provision
of eﬀort, the fee–for–service model is an eﬀort–contingent contract. In most parts of Africa,
the highest quality facilities are operated by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), almost
always religious orders (missions). Importantly, patients choose providers based on the illness
from which they are suﬀering. When patients have health insurance and/or a primary care
physician they might choose a physician and then visit that physician for almost any medical
condition (if they choose to seek any care). However, in rural Africa, there is no health
insurance and patients must carry all their records (if they have any) with them to every
visit. Though a patient might choose to visit the same physician because of proximity,
15experience or reputation, they are free to choose between all possible practitioners for each
and every illness. It is very common all over Africa to observe the same patients choosing
diﬀerent providers when they suﬀer from diﬀerent illnesses. This is important because we
contend that the choice of practitioner is, in part, determined by the illness from which
people suﬀer.
Traditional Healers Traditional healers in Africa are paid (after a ﬁxed fee) only if the
patient is cured: an outcome–contingent contract. The value of the outcome is shared be-
tween healer and patient according to a sharing rule, such that sp + sm = 1. Contracts are
negotiated between patients and healers before the healer diagnoses the patient. Although
patients often pay healers very little, when they are cured payments can be substantial.
Healers feel no obligation to accept every patient though they refuse patients infrequently.
Leonard (2003) discusses interviews with traditional healers and the anthropological litera-
ture and notes that healers talk at length about the importance of patient eﬀort and their
understanding of patient eﬀort in their cures. Many healers use modern medicines as well
as herbal medicines and therefore the diﬀerential access to technology (compared to modern
practitioners), though great, is not as great as casual observation would suggest. In addition,
traditional healers—because they are seen as being the agents of higher powers and are re-
spected in the community (and sometimes feared)—are able to behave as if they could verify
outcomes. Thus patients are choosing between traditional healers and a series of modern
providers (some of whom provide high powered incentives in an eﬀort–contingent contract)
for every illness condition.
NGO health care providers Both government and mission facilities use an eﬀort–
contingent contract. The government, however, uses very low–powered incentives and does
not represent a compelling example. On the other hand, missions facilities are well-run,
and medical personnel are frequently supervised. Patients pay a ﬁxed fee to the mission
and practitioners are monitored and compensated by their employers. Monitoring typically
16involves examination of records kept on patients as well as actual observation and further
training. The patients’ symptoms and complaints are part of all records and therefore it is
possible to verify whether procedures and records follow protocols developed for each set of
complaints. If a particular record or collection of records is determined to be in violation
of standards, the practitioner is punished in accordance with the gravity of the deviation.9
In the previous section we showed that optimal eﬀort varies with α and β, and each illness
condition represents a unique α β pair, therefore an illness condition protocol is equivalent
to an eﬀort–contingent contract in which medical eﬀort is optimally determined by α and β.
Practitioner compensation at this institution is eﬀort–contingent.
Evidence of illness based choice of providers Mwabu (1986) analyzed patient choice of
health providers in rural Kenya, where the contract used by traditional healers was similar
to the one described above.10 Table 1 shows the relationship of chief complaints to the
ﬁrst practitioner visited in this study and clusters of chief complaint/practitioner matches
generated by cluster analysis. The cluster analysis suggests that visits to providers are
being determined (at least in part) by illness conditions (or chief complaints). Cluster three
corresponds to illnesses that lead to visits primarily to traditional healers and mission clinics.
Clearly, asthma, body pain and joint pain are illnesses that require eﬀort from both the doctor
and the patient as well as a degree of cooperation between them, providing some suggestive
evidence for our theoretical hypothesis.
The empirical results summarized in Table 1, however, do not control for patient or house-
hold characteristics, or travel costs. Moreover, chief complaint is essentially the diagnosis,
information that the patient learned after visiting a provider. In a model of patient choice,
careful attention must be paid to information patients have before they choose a provider.
In the analysis that follows, we employ a dataset from rural Cameroon that allows us to
9In practice, facilities with stronger incentives use discretionary bonuses, and the threat of termination to
encourage the provision of eﬀort. Mliga (2000) reports that, in Tanzania, where he studied 4 diﬀerent health
care provision systems, those organizations that had the power to use these forms of incentives provided
signiﬁcantly superior quality of care, as judged by other clinicians.
10Personal communication with the author.
17overcome each of these limitations.
Table 1: Distribution of ﬁrst visits by illnesses and illness clusters across providers (Rural
Kenya)
Cluster Chief Govt Missn Priv Govt Phmcy Trad.
complaint clinic clinic clinic hosp. or shop healer Self None
1 Ear 25.0 12.0 12.0 12.5 25.0 25.5
1 Eye 40.0 26.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 13.3
1 Cough 36.4 27.3 2.3 22.7 3.5 13.8
1 Vomiting 40.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
1 Backache 36.1 27.8 8.3 11.1 11.1 5.5
1 Abdomen 41.5 16.9 4.6 1.5 24.6 3.1 6.2 1.5
1 Rib pain 30.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 30.0
1 Diarrhea 25.0 35.0 20.0 5.0 15.0
Mean 34.3 23.3 4.4 2.6 18.5 2.4 7.0 8.3
2 Wounds 52.6 15.8 10.5 15.8 5.2
2 Fainting 66.7 33.3
Mean 59.7 24.6 5.3 7.9 2.6
3 Asthma 20.0 40.0 40.0
3 Bodypain 23.5 17.7 11.8 5.9 29.4 5.9 5.9
3 Joint pain 20.0 20.0 6.7 6.7 20.0 13.3 6.7
3 Other 28.6 14.3 14.3 14.3 28.6
Mean 23.0 23.0 6.6 5.3 3.0 29.5 4.8 3.2
4 Malaria 50.0 37.7 7.1 7.1
4 Leprosy 60.0 20.0 20.0
Mean 55.5 28.9 3.5 3.5
5 Swelling 20.0 60.0 20.0
5 Heart 10.0 40.0 10.0 20.0 20.0
Mean 15.0 50.0 5.0 10.0 20.0
6 Headache 21.9 9.5 2.9 0.9 47.6 3.8 4.8 8.6
6 Fever 17.7 8.8 58.8 5.9 8.8
Mean 19.8 9.2 1.5 0.5 53.2 1.9 5.4 8.7
7 Tuberculosis 66.7 33.3
All entries are percentages. Blanks represent 0.0%. Source: Mwabu (1986)
2.1 Mbonge sub-division, South West Province Cameroon
To test our theory, we use data on individual choices of practitioner collected in Mbonge
Sub-Division, in the South-West province of Cameroon in 1994. Forty villages were randomly
chosen and twenty randomly selected households from each village were interviewed. Data
18were collected on all members of the household. 4,489 individuals were thus polled, and 681
illness episodes were reported within the month previous to the survey. Of primary interest
to this work was the ﬁrst location visited in the search for care and 252 of these episodes
resulted in ﬁrst visits to traditional healers, mission clinics or mission hospitals. The other
major source of health care is the government health system (289 visits) with drug peddlers,
pharmacists, neighbors, private hospitals, private clinics and parastatal hospitals rounding
out the sample.11 Mission clinics and hospitals are both under the same organization and
are monitored using the same technology. The major diﬀerence between clinics and hospitals
is one of skills not incentives.
Despite its wealth (relative to other areas of Cameroon and Africa) and the importance
of commerce, roads in this area are terrible. There is only one all-weather road, and many
of the villages surveyed are far from roads with regular traﬃc. Nevertheless, we observe
signiﬁcant bypassing of facilities. Nearly 80% of all visits to modern providers were to a
provider who was not the closest provider, suggesting a strong revealed preference for the
care that is available at facilities visited. However, it is not the case that patients are visiting
a few types of providers, but rather that patients are sometimes visiting one provider and
other times visiting another. We suggest that it is information that patients possess about
the illness from which they suﬀer that drives them to exercise choice and incur signiﬁcant
cost in the search for care. The survey polled respondents on the characteristics of the
episode from which they suﬀered: all of the symptoms they experienced; the self–declared
severity of the disease; the number of days sick before seeking care; and the number of those
days in which the patient was bedridden. With these characteristics of the disease plus the
age and sex of the individual and information about endemic diseases in the area (but not
information on the choice of provider or the diagnosis), all illness episodes were scored using
the deﬁnitions below. The scores were created by reference to medical texts which contained
11All of the regressions reported below were also run with the government as a third type of institution
from which patients could choose and none of the coeﬃcients on the choice between traditional healers and
missions were signiﬁcantly aﬀected.
19information on diagnostic tests necessary for collections of symptoms, as well as information
about severity, possible outcomes and the possibility for patient eﬀort to impact outcomes.
These scores were validated by scores created by two doctors and a nurse experienced in
tropical medicine (Leonard, 2003).
Responsiveness of the condition to Patient Eﬀort The degree to which outcome de-
pends on the eﬀort of the patient. This is our estimate of α.
Responsiveness of the condition to Medical Eﬀort The degree to which outcome de-
pends on the eﬀort of the practitioner. This is our estimate of β.
Responsiveness of the condition to skill Patients can choose between three levels of
skill and capacity: untrained or informally trained providers (corresponding to tradi-
tional healers), providers at clinics and providers at hospitals. This variable represents
three data points for each illness condition. This is our estimate of π, which is a major
component of A.
Outcome Range What is the possibility for a very bad health outcome given the disease
from which the patient suﬀers? This is an important element of A.
Summary statistics for all of these and other variables used in this analysis are available
in Leonard (2003).
2.2 Estimation
Patients choose providers on the basis of the expected utility at that provider minus ﬁxed
costs and travel costs. Expected utility will be aﬀected by the contract under which medical
and patient eﬀort are delivered as well as the skill of the provider in question. The ﬁxed costs
are constant and are therefore not a source of variation, but travel costs diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
We know the distance to the nearest mission clinic and hospital for each individual but
we do not know the distance to the nearest traditional healer. We know that there are
20many healers and that they are widely dispersed and therefore assume that travel costs to
traditional healers are zero.
Individuals choose between two types of providers and three locations. Types (indexed
by k) are traditional (TH) and missions (M). The locations (indexed by j) are traditional
(TH), mission clinic (MC), and mission hospital (MH). Thus k=TH if j=TH and k=M if
j=MC or MH. Coeﬃcients are obtained by maximizing the following log likelihood with
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(12)
δij = 1 if the ith individual visits provider j and 0 otherwise. x is a vector of characteristics of
the individual. There is only one vector per individual, but there are three sets of coeﬃcients,
representing the three locations between which a patient can choose.12 x includes the age,
gender, education level and income of the patient as well as the same variables for the
caretaker in the case where the patient is a child or invalid. x also includes a constant and
estimated household wealth13, years of schooling and a dummy variable for whether or not
the patient is an adult. Thus, for example, any patient has only one level of income, but
income has a potentially diﬀerent eﬀect at each of the three providers.
y is a vector of information about the locations visited. The data varies across providers
but the coeﬃcient does not.14 y includes the estimated travel cost to each provider and the
skill of the provider for the illness condition reported. Thus, while each provider potentially
has a diﬀerent travel cost the eﬀect of travel cost is the same at each provider; for this
variable, two providers each 100 kms from the patient are treated as the same.
12This is the standard multinomial logit framework.
13To get a measure of household wealth we estimated total household income and regressed this on ob-
servable characteristics of the household (employment type, construction of primary residence, ownership of
consumer durables, etc.) and used the predicted household income as a measure of household wealth.
14This corresponds to the McFadden Conditional Logit.
21z is a vector of information about the illness condition and is therefore only one vector
of information with two sets of coeﬃcients representing traditional healers and missions. z
includes the elasticity of the given condition to patient eﬀort (α), the elasticity with respect
to medical eﬀort (β), the product of the two (α · β) and the outcome range for the given
condition. Each illness condition has only one set of characteristics but these characteristics
can have diﬀerent eﬀects at a traditional healer than at a mission.15 Note that in order to
solve the model we normalize γTH and ρTH to zero. The entire regression is just a speciﬁc
case of the more general conditional logit model (Maddala, 1983, pp. 44) and therefore has
the required properties for obtaining a solution.
Thus • mission hospitals, mission clinics and traditional healers are potentially diﬀerent
with respect to individual characteristics, • missions (both clinics and hospitals) are diﬀerent
from traditional healers in their comparative advantage for diﬀerent illness conditions and
• all three are diﬀerent distances from patients and have diﬀerent skills (for each illness
condition).
2.3 Results
In the regression that follows, after controlling for other important variables, we are looking
for the following patterns. We expect that patient utility at traditional healers is more likely
to be higher than at missions when eﬀort complementarity is high; when α and β are both
large. We expect that patient utility is higher at missions when eﬀort complementarity is
low; when α or β are large but not both simultaneously. Thus we have included the product
of α and β, as well as (in separate regressions) the residual of the product regressed on both
α and β ([ α · β). This residual is uncorrelated with both α and β and therefore represents a
‘complementarity’ eﬀect. When α · β is large, the probability of a visit to a mission should
decrease. When α·β is small and when α or β is large the probability of a visit to a mission
should increase. Thus, when we are trying to explain the visit to the mission the coeﬃcient
15Adding the additional terms ρ0
kzk has the same eﬀect as restricting some of the coeﬃcients in the η
vector to be equal to each other.
22for α and β should be greater than zero and the coeﬃcient for α·β should be less than zero.
Table 2: Conditional Logit of Choice of Practitioner (contract type) on illness condition
characteristics
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Restricted multinomial variables (γ): Mission Facilities
α 0.587 (0.267)‡ -0.155(0.105) 0.69 (0.268)‡ -0.122(0.099)
β 0.416 (0.221)† -0.153(0.133) 0.418 (0.217)† -0.205(0.126)†
α · β -0.142(0.047)‡ -0.155(0.047)‡
[ α · β -0.142(0.047)‡ -0.155(0.047)‡
outcome range 0.38 (0.138)‡ 0.38 (0.138)‡ 0.413 (0.130)‡ 0.413 (0.130)‡
Restricted multinomial variables (γ): Government Facilities
α 0.376 (0.248) -0.087(0.092)
β 0.042 (0.201) -0.313(0.121)‡
α · β -0.088(0.042)‡
[ α · β -0.088(0.042)‡
outcome range 0.499 (0.127)‡ 0.499 (0.127)‡
Conditional variables (ρ)
travel cost -0.379(0.161)‡ -0.379(0.161)‡ -0.742(0.095)‡ -0.742(0.095)‡
provider skill 0.236 (0.121)† 0.236 (0.121)† 0.234 (0.081)‡ 0.234 (0.081)‡
General Multinomial variables (η)
constant included included included included
individual chars included included included included
caregiver chars included included included included
observations 252 252 533 533
log-likelihood 201.80 201.80 699.86 699.86
Dependent variable is the choice of provider. Default choice is traditional healer. Standard errors in
parentheses. Positive coeﬃcient for γ represents increased probability of choosing mission (either clinic or
hospital) over a traditional healer. Positive coeﬃcient for ρ represents increased probability of choosing
providers with a greater value for that variable. (Negative coeﬃcient for travel implies patients prefer
providers who are closer (smaller travel cost) after controlling for other factors).
‡signiﬁcant at 97.5% for one-sided test †signiﬁcant at 95% for one-sided test
Table 2 displays the results of the four logit regressions. In Model A and B, we use the
data restricted to the choice between traditional healer and both types of mission facilities.
In Models C and D, we add the data on government facilities. In Model A and C we use
the standard deﬁnition for joint eﬀort (α · β) and in Models B and D we use the residual
deﬁnition ([ α · β). Note that the only diﬀerence between A and B and between C and D is
in the coeﬃcients (and standard errors) for α, β.
In all models the impact of the product of eﬀorts is negative and signiﬁcant. When
23patients suﬀer from an illness that requires large amounts of eﬀort on the part of both
patients and practitioners they are less likely to visit a mission facility (more likely to visit
a traditional healer). In addition, the impact of outcome range, travel costs and skill is
constant across models. Patients prefer mission facilities (and government facilities) when
the possibility of a bad health outcome is higher, they prefer facilities that are closer and
they prefer practitioners with a greater skill for the illness from which they suﬀer.
The impact of α and β directly varies with the speciﬁcation. Since these variables in-
terplay with their product it is easier to see the behavior implied by this speciﬁcation in a
table of elasticities.
Table 3: Elasticities of Probabilities with respect to Characteristics
Change in percentage probability of visit
from a 1% change in variable from its mean
variable Traditional Healer Mission Clinic Mission Hospital
outcome range -0.205 0.146 0.059
travel to MC 0.101 -0.218 0.117
travel to MH 0.119 0.348 -0.467
α at low β -0.038 0.027 0.011
α at ¯ β 0.083 -0.060 -0.024
α at high β 0.128 -0.092 -0.036
β at low α -0.063 0.045 0.018
β at ¯ α 0.038 -0.027 -0.011
β at high α 0.115 -0.082 -0.032
Low indicates 20th percentile and high indicates 80th percentile
Table 3 reports the marginal impact of the variables on the probability of a visit to any
given provider. The table corresponds to the data in Models A and B. The entries can be
read as follows. Increasing the outcome range by 1% leads to a decrease of 0.21% in the
probability of a visit to a traditional healer, an increase of 0.15% in the probability of a visit
to a mission clinic and a 0.06% increase in the probability of a visit to a mission hospital. The
elasticities with respect to α and β reported in the table combine the direct and interaction
eﬀects. The eﬀect of an increase in α or β from their mean values depends on the magnitude
of the other elasticity. When β is low, increasing α decreases the probability of choosing
24an outcome–contingent contract (the traditional healer), but when β is large increasing α
increases this probability. The same pattern holds for β with respect to α. These elasticities
are signiﬁcant, but also large. They are on the same scale as the impact of travel costs,
something we know to be very important in the search for medical care.
Patterns of patient choices between contracts display exactly the characteristics predicted
by a model of two–sided asymmetric information. Outcome-contingent contracts are pre-
ferred when α and β are both large. Eﬀort-contingent contracts are preferred when α alone
is large or when β alone is large. These results oﬀer strong support to the hypothesis that
patient utility is aﬀected by the contract available at any given provider.
3 Modeling Patient Practitioner Interaction
The institution of traditional medicine is not generalizable, but we suggest that the approach
to patient eﬀort might be. Although traditional healers are severely handicapped by their
health technology they continue to oﬀer attractive services to patients because they under-
stand the importance of the interaction between patients and providers. This strength is
clear in interviews with healers, but it is also apparent in the data we have introduced.
The model we have described and the informational restrictions that we have put forward
ﬁt the data we have analyzed. However, in order to draw conclusions about the relative at-
tractiveness of outcome– versus eﬀort–contingent contracts we need to discuss the generality
of our assumptions. Are traditional healers better at patient–practitioner interaction because
they are a culturally based institution with strong roots in the community, or because they
use an outcome–contingent contract? Can a regulator develop a model of patient behavior
that eliminates the ineﬃciency in the eﬀort–contingent contract?
Health care and advances in health care technology appear increasingly ‘sterile’, in that
the patient is viewed as less and less of an actor in her own health. The fact that doctors do
not make house calls is driven by other factors, but it prevents doctors from seeing patients in
25their own environment. Not only do traditional healers make house calls, but they frequently
interview family members about the condition. In addition, healers adopt the valuations of
patients. A healer would not say “I cured her, but she continues to complain.” In his practice
well-being and healthiness are inseparable.
The NGO providers that enter the empirical analysis appear to be using an unnecessarily
restricted form of monitoring that does not properly take into account patient eﬀort. We
know this is the view of health care regulators in this area, but we do not know if this
is a necessary view. Although the empirical evidence is compelling, the theory we have
advanced suggests that the regulator could easily adopt a superior technology. In order to
know whether such a technology would in fact improve outcomes we need to have a more
complete understanding of the interaction between patients and practitioners. Even if the
regulator assumes a better technology he will always be distant from the actual consultation
and will never be able to observe patient eﬀort. Is there something about the relationship
that requires the presence of a medical practitioner who is compensated on the basis of
outcomes?
We do not have the data to answer this question, but theory oﬀers an interesting insight.
The Nash solution that we have assumed in the outcome–contingent problem can be achieved
through many mechanisms, some of which take the form of sequential announcements of
intentions before any eﬀort is exerted. In this tatonnement process, the players discuss their
intentions until they reach a point where neither wishes to change their action; the Nash
equilibrium. It is easy to imagine that the bargaining that takes place between a patient and
a traditional healer as capturing the beneﬁts of such a process. With a regulator enforcing
eﬀort, this communication would have to take place between the regulator and the patient,
or the regulator would have to force the practitioner to engage in this communication. This
might be diﬃcult to do. Our model does not capture these complexities16 and our empirical
16In our model there is only one round of communication; the regulator makes a crude guess (˜ p) and the
patient reacts to this guess. We can advance the model so that the regulator reacts to the patient’s reaction
to his guess. The inﬂuence of the ﬁrst crude guess is reduced, but not eliminated and our results still stand.
Continuing the cycle—the patient reacts to the regulator’s reaction to the patient’s reaction to the crude
26analysis does not contain the ‘experiment’ that would allow us to make comments about
this. As we observe few modern providers under an outcome–contingent contract, we cannot
know whether the informational assumptions of our model are truly binding.
In addition, the regulator who seeks to maximize social welfare does not necessarily
earn or obtain direct utility from social welfare. If the regulator has mistakenly modeled
the patient reaction function, he is unlikely to be presented with any evidence of his error.
On the other hand, a physician paid on the basis of outcomes could quickly develop an
accurate understanding of patients both because of physical proximity to them, and because
his payment increases when he gets it right. Paying a practitioner on the basis of outcomes
rather than eﬀort will, at the very least, force practitioners to consider the role of patient
eﬀort.
4 Conclusions
This paper develops a model of dual hidden eﬀort and compares the relative performance of
two physician compensation strategies: one where compensation is eﬀort contingent, and one
where compensation is outcome contingent. Although it is clear that either contract could
achieve the ﬁrst best solution if there were no additional information restrictions, under
relatively general restrictions we can show that each contract is likely to be superior for a
range of illnesses. In particular, outcome–based contracts are most likely to be successful
when both the patient and the practitioner play important complementary roles in the cure
of the illness, and eﬀort–contingent contracts are likely to be successful when either eﬀort is
necessary, but not both.
Evidence to support this theory is provided by an empirical analysis of patient choice
of health care providers in Africa. The analysis provides strong evidence for the principal
guess and so on—the inﬂuence of the initial guess gets smaller and smaller and the solution approaches the
full information solution. The set of illness conditions for which outcome–contingent contracts are superior
to eﬀort–contingent contracts gets smaller and smaller until it is eliminated. However, our basic intuition
remains.
27theoretical result. Patients with disease conditions that are relatively responsive to patient
and practitioner eﬀort are more likely to seek treatment from a traditional healer who is
paid based on outcomes. When the disease is not particularly responsive to one of the two
types of eﬀort, patients visit eﬀort-compensated physicians at mission health care providers.
Elasticity measures with respect to eﬀort complementarity are large and on the same scale
as the signiﬁcant travel costs facing patients in this area. Contracts matter.
The ability to verify all outcomes in health care is not a transferable technology. Since
outcome–contingent contracts cannot be implemented for non-veriﬁable outcomes, this limits
the set of illnesses for which such a contract can be implemented. However, for that set of
outcomes that are veriﬁable, outcome–contingent contracts appear most attractive when
medical and patient eﬀort are both very useful in the cure.
Extensions The most immediate use for outcome–contingent contracts is to pay doctors or
organizations on the basis of population average outcomes. For public health interventions,
doctors could be paid in an eﬀort–contingent manner (for example, time spent on vaccination
campaign) or an outcome–contingent manner (for example, reducing cholera outbreaks or
malaria prevalence). In this case the outcomes represent average or public health targets,
rather than individual observations. This will raise some concerns about who does the
measuring, but these are not insurmountable. Our model suggests two concerns: First, if
patients contribute to the achievement of public health goals (as they would in the cholera
and malaria example) the regulator should use an outcome rather than input compensated
scheme. In the narrow conﬁnes of our model, the outcome contingent contract could lead to
superior outcomes because the eﬀort–contingent contract would fail to take proper account
of patient contributions. In the broader spirit of the model, the outcome–contingent contract
would force the practitioner to think about the relationship between his eﬀort and that of
the population he serves and to engage in a more cooperative endeavor.
Second, for any type of outcome but particularly for outcomes where patient eﬀort mat-
28ters, results will be improved by insuring the maximum possible share of outcome is gained
by the patient (sp is as close as possible to 1). This will increase their incentives to cooperate.
Functionally this means that if patients themselves have to compensate the practitioner for
meeting a mark, their share will fall and their participation will be diminished. It would
be better to implement a scheme in which local populations pay to a fund according to the
expected outcome of any project and the fund then compensates the physician according
to the actual outcome—injecting funds for better than expected outcomes, and withholding
funds for less than expected outcomes. If these marginal contributions had to be made by
the population served, it would decrease their incentives to provide proper eﬀort.
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30A Mathematical Appendices
A.1 A Model of Health Care
In this section we develop a model of health care from basic principals. The form derived is
the same as the one used in the paper, but the assumptions necessary to put aside concerns
about relaxed incentive compatibility constraints17 and risk aversion are spelled out in detail.
We begin with an individual who has fallen sick from an unknown disease (but a known
illness condition, where the illness condition is described by the symptoms of the patient).
The given level of health is H. Health intervention might lead to a change in the level of
health, ∆H. We simplify the idea of health intervention by assuming that there are only
two possible outcomes; the worst outcome ∆H = h and the best outcome ∆H = ¯ h. These
outcomes depend only on the disease condition and not on any characteristics of the patient
or the practitioner. We think of ¯ h as being a full recovery and h as being no change in the
health status.
The probability of achieving either outcome is determined by two binomial distributions.
φ? is the ‘true diagnosis’ distribution and φ∅ is the ‘false diagnosis’ distribution. We motivate
these distributions as follows; if the patient’s condition is correctly diagnosed, and the proper
treatment regime is prescribed, understood and followed, the patient will have a probability
of full recovery of q?. If the diagnosis is incorrect the probability of recovery is q∅. The
probability of failing to recover is 1 − q? with the ‘true diagnosis’ and 1 − q∅ with the ‘false
diagnosis.’ In health, often everything is done as it should be and the patient does not
recover. On the other hand, patients frequently recover when nothing has been done for
their health (or when incorrect actions have been taken).
Health care is a set of technologies that probabilistically span φ? and φ∅. A ‘better’
technology is one that has a higher probability of choosing the ‘correct diagnosis’ distribution
than another technology. We represent the technology by e (0 ≤ e ≤ 1) where
∆H ∼ e · φ
? + (1 − e) · φ
∅ (13)
The ‘best’ technology (e = 1) has q? chance of leading to recovery, and the ‘worst’ technology
(e = 0) leads to a chance of recovery of q∅.18
The properties of the two binomial distributions are given by the illness condition. The
patient cannot choose the distribution under which to seek health care, but she does have
some control over the magnitude of health technology (e). e is generally a function of patient
eﬀort, patient skill, practitioner eﬀort and practitioner skill. Unobservable eﬀorts imply that
the patient does not ever observe e, only whether the outcome was ¯ h or h. Since both
outcomes are possible with all e the patient can never impute physician eﬀort even if she
17Mirlees (1975) as cited in Hart and H¨ olmstrom (1987)) shows that the ﬁrst order conditions do not
describe globally optimal actions for distributions such as H = h + θ or H = h · θ when θ is any of the
standard candidates for random distributions. Thus in order to obtain some theoretical results the choice of
functional form for H is crucial.
18We deliberately based this description of ∆H on the Spanning Condition of Grossman and Hart (1983)
and the Linear Distribution Function Condition of Hart and H¨ olmstrom (1987), which will allow us to
characterize incentive compatibility constraints as ﬁrst order conditions or relaxed incentive compatibility
constraints.
31knows her own level of eﬀort, her own skill and the practitioner skill. Thus, patients can
only expect incentive compatible eﬀort which varies according to the means of physician
compensation.
Utility from health can be modeled in a variety of diﬀerent ways. We follow the basic
model of Grossman (1975) and consider health as increasing the hours of time available to
consume work and leisure as well as augmenting utility directly. Thus U = (H,I(H),c(p)),
where H is the health level, I(H) is the income potential at that level of health, p is patient
eﬀort and c(p) is the disutility of patient eﬀort. An increase in H leads to an increase in
utility through a direct as well as an income eﬀect.
The expected value of health is
EU = eq
? ¯ U + e(1 − q
?)U + (1 − e)q
∅ ¯ U + (1 − e)(1 − q
∅)U (14)
¯ U = U[¯ h,(I(¯ h) − C),c(p)]
U = U[h,(I(h) − C),c(p)]
C is the total cost of a visit. We assume a separable utility form such that U = V [H,I(H)]−
C − c(p). Although income and total costs are measured in the same units and need not
be separated, we choose this formulation for the following reasons. The income (or earning
potential of the patient) and health level for good outcomes is the same whether the patient
sought health care or not; it depends on the outcome, not the process. Thus the part of
utility inside the utility operator (V [H,I(H)]) depends on the outcome, not on the eﬀort
exerted. Costs and disutility have a linear relation to utility. For ease of exposition we
write V [¯ h,I(¯ h)] as ¯ V and V [h,I(h)] as V . For any given patient and illness condition
there are only two possible V ; ¯ V and V . Diﬀerent health technologies represent diﬀerent
probabilities of each event occurring but do not change the value of the event. Note that
because stochastic health outcomes are measured in utility (not dollars), all forms of risk
aversion can be accommodated in this model. Further, so long as treatment and patient
eﬀort costs are small, i.e. they do not change wealth so much that they change the marginal
utility of health, the linear separability assumption is a reasonable one. In this representation,
‘risk aversion’ is represented by a high ¯ V , not by changing marginal utility of income.













V − C − c(p) (15)
Of interest to the patient is the change in expected utility. We choose as a natural comparison





 ¯ V − V

− C − c(p) (16)
At this point we make a number of further simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that
V is equal to zero, a simple scaling assumption. Furthermore, we assume that utility from
health is of the form ¯ h · ω where ω represents the combination of the opportunity cost of
healthy time and a per unit value of health. Thus,
∆EU = e(q
? − q
∅)ω¯ h − C − c(p)
32Without loss of generality we deﬁne the technology for health production as being a standard
production function divided by a ‘maximum’ level of production for that function, e = h/¯ h.
Thus, where e varies between 0 and 1, h varies between 0 and ¯ h.
∆EU = (q
? − q
∅)ωh − C − c(p) (17)
For ease of exposition, in the body of the paper, we move the expression (q? − q∅) into h,
and refer to the net expected value of health as
∆EU = ωh − C − c(p) (1)
By using the spanning condition we have created a random distribution of health outcomes
in which eﬀorts cannot be inferred from outcomes and incentive compatibility constraints
can be represented by ﬁrst order conditions. In addition, by allowing for only two outcomes
and assuming costs and disutilities are small relative to health valuations, we have a ﬁnal
speciﬁcation which appears to be a utility over expected outcomes but is in fact an expected
utility formulation. Thus our choice of utility for the model of the paper, though restrictive,
is not unrealistic.
A.2 Production with full information, under outcome– and eﬀort–
contingent contracts
This section shows the derivation of the results discussed in the text. We begin with Equa-
tion 5 from the text. Maximizing welfare with respect to p and m and solving the system of

















These expressions for optimal eﬀort levels can then be employed to determine social
welfare and practitioner and patient utility.19












19We assume that patients retain the full value of their health, minus the disutility of their eﬀort and a
ﬁxed fee (which we drop for notational simplicity). This derivation of utility makes the most sense in the
health context (where fees are generally ﬁxed). Social welfare more accurately reﬂects the surplus created
in a general context.


























































































Equation 22a and Equation 22b show how ˆ p changes with α and β respectively and Equa-


































































sp )β and sp are always less than one. If p?
O and m?
O are greater than one, all three
derivatives above are positive. Inputs with values greater than one is the standard Cobb-
Douglas assumption, but takes on special meaning in this context.20 In this model, the
level of inputs supplied is endogenous, so we cannot assume that patient eﬀort and medical
eﬀort are greater than one, but must examine the conditions necessary for this result to
obtain. Ensuring that p?
O and m?
O are greater than one simply requires that seeking health
care is valuable relative to the costs of eﬀort.21 If this were not the case, one would imagine
20This assumption is standard because when the inputs are less than one, increases in the productivity
of an input yields lower levels of output. This peculiar property occurs because fractions raised to a higher
power produce smaller numbers.
21A must be ‘large’ compared to both 1 and D. Since A has no directly measurable units, but is meant
34that the health care market for this disease would not arise. For example, patients do not
generally seek medical care for a bruised elbow because the beneﬁt to jointly producing




∂β (Equation 22b), and
∂2ˆ p
∂β∂α (Equation 22c) are all positive.
Proof of Proposition 2 The proof of proposition 2 is outlined in two parts. In the ﬁrst
part the proposition is established in the case the outcome–contingent utility is equal to
eﬀort–contingent utility and in the second that outcome–contingent utility is greater the
eﬀort–contingent utility. The diﬀerence in welfare is:
WO − WE =
WFI
1 − α − β
 

























If we examine WO − WE at the point ˆ p (where UO = UE) we obtain the following
WO − WE (UO = UE) =
WFI


















p is always greater than 0 when sp < 1.22 Thus, Equation 24a is always
positive.
The diﬀerence in welfare is positive if:






















(1−α)(1−β) > 0 (25)
Recall that ˆ p is the value of ˜ p for which the utility under the two regimes is equal. We
introduce a notation for ˜ p, ˜ p = ˆ pt. When t is equal to one therefore, ˜ p = ˆ p and we have the
solution outlined in equation (24a). When t is less than 1, ˜ p < ˆ p the utility with outcome–
contingent contract is greater than the utility with eﬀort–contingent contracts. Thus to
prove proposition 3, we need to show that when t is less than one, equation (25) always
holds.
We start with the fact that when t = 1 equation (25) is positive by proposition 2. Let
g denote the expression in equation (25). Taking the derivative of g with respect to t we
to capture value, ‘large’ means that the value of health care exceeds the eﬀort costs. When A is ‘large’
increasing the elasticity of outcomes with respect to either eﬀort increases the utility of the patient. In other
words, when medical eﬀort (for example) is more productive, patient utility is improved.
22When sp = 1 , 1 − smβ − sp + s
1
β








p − 1, which is
always negative. In the limit, as sp approaches 1, 1 − smβ − sp + s
1
β
p βsm approaches 0 from above, and is




















Since either sp or sm is always less than or equal to one, with one strictly less than one,
∂g
∂t < 0 whenever t is less than one — it is increasing as t falls toward 1. If g is decreasing in
t when t is less than one, and g is positive when t is equal to one, then g must be positive
whenever t is less than one. Thus the diﬀerence between welfare with outcome–contingent
contracts and welfare with eﬀort–contingent contracts is always positive when ˜ p < ˆ p, or
when UO > UE. QED.
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